Wednesday, May 29, 2013

"A little too cozy"

Bloomberg radio's Kathleen Hays's interview yesterday with former Republican Senator Judd Gregg caught my attention. Being that I aim to exploit every opportunity to expose incidences of cronyism to my readers, I find Mr. Gregg---who went straight from the U.S. Senate to Goldman Sachs---to be a particularly interesting character.

Now, two years after leaving office, he's made yet another career change; he's now the CEO of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), Wall Street's largest lobbying group. Oh my!!

After the warm-up---where Mr. Gregg spoke inspirationally about how a "strong (insert crony here) capital market system" is essential to the long-term success of everyday folk---followed by a 10 minute love fest that Ms. Hays instigated by lauding his transparency (of all things), a listener tweeted in, asking Mr. Gregg to comment on the fact that Citigroup wrote 70 lines of an 85-line bill titled the Swaps Regulatory Improvement Act. Ms. Hays added; "isn't this just a little too cozy?". He attempted to redirect by talking about his experience (just before he left office to go to work for Goldman Sachs btw) as one of two senators in charge of "negotiating" derivatives regulations in the wake of the financial crisis. Ms. Hays interrupted him mid-stream with "but what about the latest one---the Swaps Regulatory Improvement Act---and how this one's coming down?" He then struggled through an explanation of how existing swaps regulations were poorly written and that, while he doesn't know who wrote this bill, "if it's better than what we're dealing with, and does a better job of making the markets safer, but also liquid, then that's what you want."

So, regulations that would better deal with the systemic risk posed by gargantuan banks, could---in your wildest dreams---be better written by gargantuan banks?? I tell ya, gargantuan banks must be (oh they indeed are) paying and promising an awful lot to get otherwise intelligent people (present and future lobbyists) to insult our intelligence in such a manner...

Market Commentary (audio)

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Tuesday, May 28, 2013

You believe in capitalism...

As I type the Dow is up over 200 points on the morning. The headlines suggest that supportive comments from world central bank officials (money-printers R us), a spike in existing home prices and a surge in consumer confidence has inspired willingness in buyers and stinginess in sellers. Makes sense (given how short-term traders think) to me.

Now, while you'll love your monthly statement if this keeps up, the price of stocks---that you happen to hold---agreed on by the final buyers and sellers of the day on May 31 is too fleeting a phenomenon to be getting all giddy about.

Thus, the whims of short-term traders will never be the focus for you---the savvy long-term investor. The market for stocks itself is not deserving of your affection. The marketplace---where goods and services are produced and sold---however, is. As I continue to preach, you own

Apple because you and/or oodles of people you know own an iPhone.
Google because you google.
Disney because you like movies, etc.
McDonald's because you see the traffic at their drive-thru windows.
Starbucks because you (and/or) love their coffee.
Lowe's because you own a house.
Exxon Mobil because you drive.
Boeing because you fly.
Monsanto because you eat.
Many, if not all, of the remaining 286 companies featured in the IShares S&P 500 Growth Index ETF because you believe they will continue to produce goods that others who produce goods---or who contribute to the production of goods (or services)---will want to buy.

In other words, you own companies because you believe in capitalism...

Monday, May 27, 2013

Never, ever, ever chase track records...

The factor most often leveraged by those who market their investment management services---be it a hedge fund, mutual fund, separate account manager, or your corner stock broker---is past performance. Which is interesting, since the CYA that follows every performance ad says past performance is not indicative of future results. Of course, despite the disclaimer---which is there per regulatory requirement---past performance does indeed say a lot about the skills of a given manager, right? Well, it depends.

For starters; if we're considering sector funds, past performance, generally, will be more a factor of the performance of the sector (tech, financials, energy, etc.) than of manager-skill. That's why, anymore, we're resorting to low cost sector index exchange traded funds in client portfolios. In which case, whether or not a given sector has outperformed a broad market index over the past 3 years---considering cyclicality---is of zero importance. In fact, while rebalancing---considering cyclicality---we often rotate client portfolios to sectors that have been relative under-performers of late.

As for actively managed funds, sure, past performance takes on more significance. Since all things market are cyclical, you should always buy the fund with the worst recent track record---odds are you'll be catching it right when the cycle turns to favor its manager's strategy. Ridiculous? Well, yeah, but no more so than buying a fund solely because it sports the best recent track record.

Let's do our own little experiment: I'll go to Morningstar's database right now and pull up all U.S.-based mutual funds, and, starting at the top, I'll record the calendar year performance ranking among peers for the first 5 funds that show track records back to 2008. And we'll see how we'd have done chasing yearly track records. Be right back...

Okay, I'm back. The first thing I realized when I went to Morningstar was that looking at just the first 5 funds would have forced me to pick solely on the Aberdeen fund family. So I grabbed the first Aberdeen fund with a track record going back to 2008, then jumped to the next fund family and took its first with a 2008-forward record, and so on. Here are the results:

Aberdeen Asia Bond Institutional:
2008: Underperformed 89% of its peer group. (REALLY BAD)
2009: Outperformed 91% of its peer group. (GREAT)
2010: Outperformed 92% of its peer group. (GREAT)
2011: Underperformed 79% of its peer group. (BAD)
2012: Outperformed 83% of its peer group. (GREAT)

Acadian Emerging Markets Institutional:
2008: Underperformed 84% of its peer group. (BAD)
2009: Outperformed 71% of its peer group. (VERY GOOD)
2010: Outperformed 80% of its peer group. (GREAT)
2011: Underperformed 52% of its peer group. (MEDIOCRE)
2012: Outperformed 88% of its peer group. (GREAT)

Access Capital Community Investment I
2008: Underperformed 70% of its peer group. (BAD)
2009: Outperformed 84% of its peer group. (GREAT)
2010: Underperformed 75% of its peer group. (BAD)
2011: Underperformed 84% of its peer group. (BAD)
2012: Outperformed 78% of its peer group. (GREAT)

Adams Harkness Small Cap Growth
2008: Underperformed 73% of its peer group. (BAD)
2009: Underperformed 91% of its peer group. (REALLY BAD)
2010: Outperformed 89% of its peer group. (GREAT)
2011: Underperformed 74% of its peer group. (BAD)
2012: Underperformed 54% of its peer group. (MEDIOCRE)

Adaptive Allocation C
2008: Outperformed 99+% of its peer group. (FANTASTIC!)
2009: Underperformed 95% of its peer group. (REALLY REALLY BAD!)
2010: Outperformed 97% of its peer group. (FANTASTIC!)
2011: Underperformed 96% of its peer group. (REALLY REALLY BAD!)
2012: Underperformed 99+% of its peer group. (REALLY REALLY REALLY BAD!!)

Now of course that's only five, but it is, honestly, the very first five. Run the first 50 or the first 5,000 and I suspect, by and large, you'll see the same patterns. Which gives you absolutely zero faith in the notion that track records are the most important consideration when allocating your portfolio.

In the end, it's future---as opposed to past---performance we're after. And while, as advisors, we are forever striving to add value at the margin through intelligent sector selection, what makes successful long-term investors successful is that they maintain an asset allocation that matches their time horizon, appetite for risk, income needs, etc. And that they never, ever, ever chase track records...

For more on the subject read No Magic Pill...

Friday, May 24, 2013

Affordable, it ain't...

If The Affordable Care Act (ACA), aka Obamacare, was aptly---in its intent---titled, it appears doomed to fail its objective.

Here's what Washington Post's Robert Samuelson discovered in his interviews with Professional Employer Organizations:
First, some companies now providing insurance are being hit with huge premium increases. Before Obamacare, said one PEO adviser, his clients typically received annual increases of 6 percent to 12 percent. “This year we’re seeing 30 percent rate hikes,” he said. The surge is blamed, rightly or wrongly, on the ACA’s requirement for more comprehensive coverage and on its formula for calculating premiums (aka “community rating”). Costlier insurance could cause some employers to drop it and others not to offer it. But modest increases in overall health spending could relieve pressure on premiums.

Second, most companies haven’t made final decisions. Those who have go both ways. Another adviser described a 250-worker car dealership with good wages but no health insurance; it will provide coverage and cut wages to help pay costs. Another example involved a 60-worker manufacturing firm with wages of $12 to $15 an hour. It offered bare-bones policies with steep deductibles. Confronting higher premiums for expanded coverage, the owner will drop insurance. He found the ACA “too complex,” said this adviser. Wages will be increased somewhat. With subsidies, workers might do better in the exchanges.

Third, many firms are revising their business models to minimize insurance costs. One favorite idea: Hold workers below the 30-hour weekly threshold requiring insurance. Many part-time employees who work more (say, 35 hours a week) will lose hours. One adviser discussed a movie-theater chain that will keep most staff below the threshold. Many restaurants and hotels may do likewise. Similarly, companies are striving to stay below the 50-employee ceiling that triggers the insurance mandate. Another adviser mentioned a client, an engineering firm with 48 workers, that had deliberately restrained expansion.

All of this clouds Obamacare’s promise of universal coverage. The Supreme Court’s decision that states don’t have to join the Medicaid expansion will reduce the number who get coverage. What matters for small and medium-size firms is the gap between providing coverage and paying the tax penalties. The wider it gets, the more likely it is that firms won’t provide insurance. Some will also be deterred by the “hassle factor” of complying. The less private coverage, the more federal subsidies for exchanges will rise — and the greater the chances that individual workers will forsake insurance and pay the tax penalty.

ACA is a vivid example of what should seem so obvious, but what too many politicians and virtually all "progressives" fail to understand: That government's intrusion into the marketplace to coerce outcomes it deems desirable---by imposing higher costs onto producers---inevitably hurts the very group it intends (or pretends) to help.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Careful what you ask for...

Much of the financial media buzz this week is about all that cash Apple legally shelters outside the U.S. If you happen to share John McCain's and Carl Levin's outrage, I'd like you to reconsider in light of the following points:

1. Cash "stashed" overseas was not earned in the U.S. then sent overseas. It was earned and, if at all (under agreements with taxing authorities), taxed overseas.

2. Apple is a global company, serving the global marketplace. When it manufactures a product in a foreign market, sells to consumers in that market, pockets its earnings and pays taxes in that market, what reasoning would justify a U.S. levy on those earnings?

3. If Apple pays a 2% tax in Ireland and decides to use some of its Irish earnings to establish a presence in Canada, the Canadian government will be so thrilled/smart that it wouldn't dream of hitting Apple with a 13% tax (Canada's 15% corporate tax rate minus the 2% paid in Ireland) on the way in.

4. If, on the other hand, Apple decides to invest some of its Irish earnings in the U.S., the U.S. government will be so insane as to hit Apple with a 33% tax (America's 35% corporate tax rate minus 2%) on the way in.

5. Now if Samsung (a South Korean company) pays a 2% tax in Ireland and decides to use some of its Irish earnings to establish a presence in the U.S. market, the U.S. government (like smart Canada) would be so thrilled/smart that it wouldn't dream of hitting Samsung with a 33% tax on the way in.

6. If Apple pays more taxes, are you likely to pay more or less for your next iPad? Would its employees see higher or lower advances in pay and benefits going forward? Will it hire more or fewer people going forward? Will it pay higher or lower dividends to stockholders going forward? Will its stock price grow faster or slower, if at all, going forward?

7. If Apple pays more taxes, is the federal government likely to, therefore, reduce your taxes---or otherwise enrich your life---going forward? Are politicians likely to become more or less responsible with all that additional revenue flowing in?

8. Under whose command do you think Apple's revenue would ultimately bring the greatest value to the consumer: Apple, competing with the likes of Samsung for the consumer's business? Or politicians, competing with each other for the consumer's vote?

9. Ultimately, who pays corporate taxes? Isn't it, per #6 above, customers, employees and shareholders? Clearly, if companies pay higher tax rates, and the government's win-fall doesn't flow to your tax return---which it won't---you, Pyrrhus, will be picking up the tab...

What we're talking about here is worldwide (e.g., U.S.) versus territorial (e.g., Canada) tax policy. Worldwide means, for example, a U.S. company pays U.S. tax on income wherever in the world it's earned (although the U.S. system allows for "deferral" --- meaning foreign income isn't taxed until it's brought to the U.S.). Territorial means, for example, a Canadian company pays no Canadian tax on income it earns in foreign countries (even when it's brought to Canada). Defenders of the worldwide system claim that a territorial system in the U.S. would actually---to an even greater extent---inspire U.S. multi-national companies to book their profits overseas. But, as under the present system, when we allow companies to defer tax until those earnings cross over into the U.S., aren't we inspiring them to keep profits---in perpetuity---overseas? I think the worldwide system's proponents need to realize that 96% of the world's customers live outside the U.S. I.e., opportunity so abounds outside our borders that there's little need to ever bring those earnings home. Of course that's why they'd have us do away with deferral altogether.

And why should we pray they fail at doing away with deferral altogether? Read again points 6-9.